haku: @author Spremann, K. / yhteensä: 17
viite: 7 / 17
| Tekijä: | Spremann, K. |
| Otsikko: | Assymetrische Information. |
| Lehti: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
1990 : MAY/JUN, VOL. 60:5/6, p. 561-586 |
| Asiasana: | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FINANCING INFORMATION THEORY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | Three basic types of asymmetric information are identified and characterized: 1. uncertainty about quality, often called "hidden characteristics", 2. holdup which includes stakeholder problems and it is a form of opportunism, 3. moral hazard and problems related to agency theory, often called "hidden action". Co-operation in the presence of asymmetric information cannot be achieved via the market because of transaction costs and problems with informational efficiency. Thus, additional or even alternative designs to organize co-operation are necessary. Designs that may be typical to asymmetric information are: self-selection and signaling, long termed contracts, incentives schemes. |
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