haku: @journal_id 4377 / yhteensä: 171
viite: 57 / 171
| Tekijä: | Boerner, K. Hainz, C. |
| Otsikko: | The political economy of corruption and the role of economic opportunities |
| Lehti: | Economics of transition
2009 : VOL. 17:2, p. 213-240 |
| Asiasana: | corruption institutions development voting political economy |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Rather high levels of corruption can be observed in many developing and transition countries. It is argued that the missing political support for anti-corruption policies is due to a lack of economic and financial reforms. The model of this paper is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, it is sown that this, together with the lack of economic opportunities, makes anti-corruption policies less likely. More voters are part of the corrupt system and more importantly rents from corruption are distributed differently compared to a reformed economy. It is indicated that economic liberalization increases the support for anti-corruption measures. |
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