haku: @indexterm entry conditions / yhteensä: 180
viite: 123 / 180
| Tekijä: | Stenbacka, L. R. |
| Otsikko: | Collusion in dynamic oligopolies in the presence of entry threats. |
| Lehti: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1990 : DEC, VOL. 39:2, p. 147-154 |
| Asiasana: | OLIGOPOLY ENTRY CONDITIONS ECONOMETRIC MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A generalized oligopoly supergame is considered, where an endogenous entry decision is included. It is proved that strategies based on most severe symmetric punishments can sustain some degree of collusion even with small entry barriers provided that the discount rate is sufficiently small. The model provides a justification for a view suggesting that neither substantial barriers to entry nor strategic or informational asymmetries are necessary for an oligopoly with some degree of cooperation to prevail. It is demonstrated that the model generalizes Abreu's most severe punishment strategies. The model is presented for the case with linear inverse demand. |
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