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Tekijä:Clark, D.
Riis, C.
Otsikko:Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game
Lehti:Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2000 : MAR, VOL. 42:1, p. 109-124
Asiasana:ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
ORGANIZATION
ALLOCATION
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry: uneveness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules. Only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency; in other cases, the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 213686
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