haku: @journal_id 7 / yhteensä: 1856
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| Tekijä: | Mitra, D. |
| Otsikko: | Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: a long-run model of trade policy determination |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
1999 : DEC, VOL. 89:5, p. 1116-1134 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS TRADE POLICY MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. |
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