haku: @journal_id 7 / yhteensä: 1856
viite: 39 / 1856
| Tekijä: | Marceau, N. Smart, M. |
| Otsikko: | Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
2003 : MAR, VOL. 93:1, p. 241-251 |
| Asiasana: | COMPANIES CAPITAL TAXATION ECONOMICS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Business tax systems in the United States and elsewhere exhibit substantial intersectoral differences in tax rates that create deadweight losses, often while serving no obvious public policy objective. The authors have argued some of these tax differences may be attributed to differences in industries' reliance on sunk capital, and the resulting differences in the intensity of their lobbying efforts. At first blush, the authors' argument suggests that business tax lobbying can mitigate government's incentives to impose confiscatory levies on sunk capital. But the authors' results suggest the case for allowing lobbying activities is far more ambiguous. While lobbying tends to reduce the overall tax burden on sunk capital, political contributions represent additional costs which in turn deter investment. |
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