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| Tekijä: | Wosnitza, M. |
| Otsikko: | Das Unterinvestisitionsproblem in der Publikumsgesellschaft. |
| Lehti: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1990 : NOV, VOL. 42:11, p. 947-962 |
| Asiasana: | FINANCIAL CONTROL DIRECTORS |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | Interpreting the firm as a principal agent-relationship between the outside owners and the inside managers, a model of the publicly owned firm is developed, to analyse the effects of the conflicts of interests between the two parties on the management's capital budgeting decisions. Assuming a constant and riskless manager compensation three types of underinvestment problems are identified: Firstly, there are constellations where the management omits profitable opportunities in the view of the owners. Secondly, if the management invests the realized solution in any case will be lower than the first best, i.e. value maximizing solution. Thirdly, not even the second best solution will be reached which is characterized by value maximization. |
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