haku: @indexterm TAXATION / yhteensä: 1872
viite: 95 / 1872
Tekijä:Baldursson, F.M.
Fehr, N-H. von der
Otsikko:A whiter shade of pale: On the political economy of regulatory instruments
Lehti:Journal of the European Economic Association
2007 : MAR, VOL. 5:1, p. 37-65
Asiasana:political economy
environmental economics
government
regulations
taxation
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:In this paper, an intertemporal policy game btw. changing governments differing in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes is considered. It is demonstrated that a "brown" government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes, as quotas establish property rights being costly to reverse. Conversely, a "green" government prefers to regulate by taxes to limit the incentives of future brown governments to ease regulations. Strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences, making green governments greener and brown governments browner etc.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 267424
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