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Tekijä:Allen, B.
Otsikko:Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: a Bertrand- Edgeworth approach
Lehti:Economic Theory
2000 : VOL. 15:3, p. 501-530
Asiasana:CAPACITY
ECONOMICS
THEORIES
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, this paper studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build, that is, cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 213666
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