haku: @indexterm intertemporal economics / yhteensä: 19
viite: 16 / 19
| Tekijä: | Olsen, T. Torsvik, G. |
| Otsikko: | Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: how much decentralization? |
| Lehti: | European Economic Review
1995 : AUG, VOL. 39:7, p. 1405-1428 |
| Asiasana: | DECENTRALISATION INTERTEMPORAL ECONOMICS ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In common agency, where one agent contracts with several principals, to what extent should the principals cooperate and centralize provision of incentives? If the agency is over contract complements - where an increase in activity for one principal increases the marginal value of contracting with other principals - complete centralization seems optimal, since this internalizes all externalities. The authors show that this intuition is not generally valid for dynamic agency situations. |
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