haku: @author Besley, T. / yhteensä: 19
viite: 5 / 19
Tekijä:Besley, T.
Otsikko:Paying politicians: theory and evidence
Lehti:Journal of the European Economic Association
2004 : APR-MAY, VOL. 2:2-3, p. 193-215
Asiasana:adverse selection
agency theory
moral hazard
pay
politics
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This article looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance. Political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two-period term limits is laid out. The model provides several predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems. It is also considered, what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 258435
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