haku: @author McAfee, R.P. / yhteensä: 2
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| Tekijä: | McAfee, R.P. McMillan, J. |
| Otsikko: | Bidding rings |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
1992 : JUN, VOL. 82:3, p.579-599 |
| Asiasana: | BIDDING CARTELS PAYMENT SYSTEMS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The main subject is how cartels overcome the division-of-spoils difficulties, in the specific context of bidding auctions. Coordinated bidding strategies are characterized in two cases: a weak cartel in which the bidders cannot make side-payments, and a strong cartel in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The optimal mechanism for the cartel is derived to use to decide which party receives the item and how the proceeds are distributed. The attitudes of the weak and strong cartels are examined; the former has its members submit identical bids, the latter reauctions the good among the cartel members. |
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