haku: @author Sundaram, R. K. / yhteensä: 2
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| Tekijä: | Banks, J. S. Sundaram, R. K. |
| Otsikko: | Optimal retention in agency problems |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1998 : OCT, VOL. 82:2, p. 293-323 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMIC THEORY AGENCIES COMPENSATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This study examines the interaction between a single long-lived principal and a series of short-lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. It is assumed that the principal can influence the agents' behavior only through her choice of a retention rule, which is further required to be sequentially rational. General conditions are provided, under which equilibria exist where the principal adopts a cut-off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceed a critical bound, and agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions. |
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