haku: @author Young, H. / yhteensä: 2
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Tekijä:Foster, D.
Young, H.
Otsikko:On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games
Lehti:Games and Economic Behavior
1998 : OCT, VOL. 25:1, p. 79-96
Asiasana:GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
ECONOMICS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:It is shown by example that learning rules of the fictitious play type fail to converge in certain kinds of coordination games. Variants of fictitious play in which past actions are eventually forgotten and that incorporate small stochastic perturbations are better behaved for this class of games: over the long run, players coordinate with probability one.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 186495
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