haku: @author Vogt, C. / yhteensä: 2
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| Tekijä: | Vogt, C. |
| Otsikko: | The evolution of cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma with an endogenous learning mutant |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2000 : JUL, VOL. 42:3, p. 347-373 |
| Asiasana: | Learning Co-operation Game theory Economic theory Equilibrium analysis Models |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This study considers a population initially consisting of cooperators and defectors, who are engaged in a Prisoners' Dilemma. A knowledgeable mutant is introduced who memorizes other players by experience. A formal model is derived which allows one to describe the growth of the mutant's knowledge of defectors in a precise way. When meeting known defectors, the mutant is assumed to avoid exploitation by refusing interaction. Otherwise the mutant chooses the cooperative action. According to replicator dynamics there exists a fully mixed equilibrium, a two-type equilibrium with sophisticated cooperators and defectors and the defectors-only comer solution. Depending on the parameters, these equilibria are globally stable. |
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