haku: @author Felli, L. / yhteensä: 2
viite: 1 / 2
« edellinen | seuraava »
| Tekijä: | Felli, L. Villas-Boas, J.M. |
| Otsikko: | Renegotiation and collusion in organizations |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
2000 : WINTER, VOL. 9:4, p. 453-483 |
| Asiasana: | INCENTIVES ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR |
| Vapaa asiasana: | COLLUSION RENEGOTIATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization may lead to inefficiencies and hence should be prevented in equilibrium. This paper shows that whenever the parties to an organization can renegotiate their incentive scheme after collusion, these inefficiencies can be greatly reduced. |
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA