haku: @author Garella, P. G. / yhteensä: 2
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| Tekijä: | Fluet, C. Garella, P. G. |
| Otsikko: | Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
2002 : SEP, VOL. 20:7, p. 907-930 |
| Asiasana: | Advertising Quality Oligopoly |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper addresses the issue of whether firms use price or advertising to signal quality and whether advertising has pro- or anti-competitive effects. The authors show that, when there is price rivalry, advertising may be necessary may necessary to signal quality, in contrast to singel-firm models. Signaling through price alone prevails for sufficient inter-brand quality differentials; joint price-advertising signals prevail when the quality differential is small. |
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