haku: @author Caselli, F. / yhteensä: 2
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| Tekijä: | Caselli, F. Morelli, M. |
| Otsikko: | Bad politicians |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2004 : MAR, VOL. 88:3-4, p. 759-782 |
| Asiasana: | Politics Corruption Fraud |
| Vapaa asiasana: | Bribery |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials. Their theory offers three main insights. Low-quality citizens have a 'comparative advantage' in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than those of high-quality citizens, and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office(honesty). Second, bad politicians generate negative externalities for good ones, makingtheir rewards from office increasing in the average quality of office holders. Third, incumbent policymakers can influence the rewards of future policymakers, leading to path dependence in quality: bad governments sow the seeds for more bad governments. |
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