haku: @author Spear, S. E. / yhteensä: 2
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| Tekijä: | Spear, S. E. Srivastava, S. |
| Otsikko: | On repeated moral hazard with discounting. (!Agency model) |
| Lehti: | Review of Economic Studies
1987 : OCT, VOL. 54:180, p. 599-617 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMIC THEORY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Optimal contracts are analyzed in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future. It is shown that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent's conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable. This representation reduces the multi-period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques. This reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract. |
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