haku: @author McLean Parks, J. / yhteensä: 2
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| Tekijä: | Conlon, E. J. McLean Parks, J. |
| Otsikko: | Effects of monitoring and tradition on compensation arrangements : an experiment with principal agent dyads. |
| Lehti: | Academy of Management Journal
1990 : SEP, VOL. 33:3, p. 603-622 |
| Asiasana: | PAY DYADS EARNINGS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The interaction between the existence of a tradition of non-contingent pay in a firm and the owner's ability to monitor employees, a key variable in efficiency models, on the negotiation of agreements involving contingent pay are explored. It is predicted that agents will earn more when willing to accept contingent compensation. Tradition influences the use of non-contingent pay. The results suggest that the effects of tradition are relatively powerful and unlikely to diminish over time. They also indicate that efficiency and tradition are both critical for understanding control and compensation in organizations. |
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