haku: @indexterm SOCIAL CHOICE / yhteensä: 20
viite: 14 / 20
Tekijä:Mbih, B.
Otsikko:On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
Lehti:Theory and Decision
1995 : SEP, VOL. 39:2, p. 169-188
Asiasana:STRATEGY
SOCIAL CHOICE
ECONOMICS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:A collective choice mechanism can be viewed as a game in normal form; in this article it is shown, for very attractive rules and for sets with any number of alternatives, how individuals involved in a collective decision problem can construct the preferences they choose to express. An example is given with a version of plurality rule. Manipulability results are deduced from such a characterization.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 139800
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