haku: @indexterm SOCIAL CHOICE / yhteensä: 20
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| Tekijä: | Fleurbaey, M. |
| Otsikko: | Social choice and just institutions: new perspectives |
| Lehti: | Economics and philosophy
2007 : MAR, VOL. 23:1, p. 15-43 |
| Asiasana: | institutions philosophy social choice |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in the absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis of optimal second-best institutions was thought to require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. |
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