haku: @journal_id 1275 / yhteensä: 203
viite: 77 / 203
Tekijä: | Bajari, P. Tadelis, S. |
Otsikko: | Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement contracts |
Lehti: | RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 387-407 |
Asiasana: | CONTRACTS INCENTIVES TRANSACTION COSTS |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | Inspired by facts from the private-sector construction industry, the authors develop a model that explains many stylized facts of procurement contracts. The buyer in this model incurs a cost of providing a comprehensive design and is faced with a tradeoff between providing incentives and reducing ex post transaction costs due to costly renegotiation. |
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