haku: @author Dutta, S. / yhteensä: 21
viite: 4 / 21
| Tekijä: | Dutta, S. |
| Otsikko: | Capital Budgeting and Managerial Compensation: Incentive and Retention Effects |
| Lehti: | Accounting Review
2003 : JAN, VOL. 78:1, p. 71-94 |
| Asiasana: | CAPITAL INVESTMENT STOCKS STOCK OPTIONS MANAGERIAL ACTIVITIES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper considers an agency model in which a firm's manager receives private information about an investment project. The manager has unique skills that are essential for implementing the project, and he can pursue the project inside the firm or as an outside venture on his own. The firm's owner thus faces a potential managerial retention problem, where the severity of the retention problem depends on the project's outside viability. The author's analysis shows that if the managerial retention problem is not too severe, the owner can delegate the investment decision to the manager and use a residual-income-based bonus contract to give the manager incentives to work hard and make appropriate investment decisions. |
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