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| Tekijä: | Sade, O. Schnitzlein, C. Zender, J.F. |
| Otsikko: | When less (potential demand) is more (revenue): Asymmetric bidding capacities in divisible good auctions |
| Lehti: | Review of finance
2006 : VOL. 10:3, p. 389-416 |
| Asiasana: | auctions bidding impact assessment Israel USA |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | It is shown that asymmetry in bidders' capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit auctions with commonly known final value of the good. This effect appears to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are significant differences between bidders. Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the sellers revenue than does the auction type etc. |
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