haku: @journal_id 631 / yhteensä: 215
viite: 22 / 215
| Tekijä: | Stehn, J. |
| Otsikko: | Leitlmien einer ökonomischen Verfassung für Europa |
| Lehti: | Weltwirtschaft
2002 : 3, p. 300-315 |
| Asiasana: | EUROPE ECONOMICS EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper analyses one important aspect of the constitutional debate the allocation of economic competences between the EU and the member states. It takes the theory of fiscal federalism as a starting point for an optimal allocation of economic competences. The main message of the theory is that a transfer of economic competences from a lower to a higher political level always leads to a negligence of individual preferences and, therefore, can only be economically justified if national policies cause strong spillovers (externalities) to other jurisdictions. Based on this approach, the paper proposes an allocation of economic competences that can serve as an overall guideline for a European constitution (original in German). |
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