haku: @journal_id 1464 / yhteensä: 220
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| Tekijä: | Garvey, G. T. Gaston, N. |
| Otsikko: | A theory of the optimal cost barrier to corporate takeovers |
| Lehti: | International Economic Review
1997 : AUG, VOL. 38:3, p. 657-675 |
| Asiasana: | COSTS FINANCE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS MERGERS MORAL HAZARD |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article characterizes the relevant parameters of optimal delayed compensation contracts in the presence of worker moral hazard and the threat of firm opportunism in the form of hostile takeovers. Firms in which discretionary worker efforts are important shouldn't only exhibit a great degree of deferred compensation, but should also have higher cost barriers to hostile takeovers. This may be accomplished by governance structures allowing managers to resist hostile takeovers. The likelihood of hostile takeover was not function of these governance variables, because a raider will only encounter resistance in cases where the target would otherwise be too attractive. |
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