haku: @journal_id 1464 / yhteensä: 220
viite: 139 / 220
| Tekijä: | Hyde, C.E. Rausser, G.C. Simon, L.K. |
| Otsikko: | Regulating multiple polluters: Deterrence and liability allocation |
| Lehti: | International Economic Review
2000 : MAY, VOL. 41:2, p. 495-521 |
| Asiasana: | Regulations Economic theory Welfare economics Models USA |
| Vapaa asiasana: | Environmental liability |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Regulation of multiple polluters when individual omissions are unobservable is considered. The tension btw. pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under 2 constraints: that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms. To isolate the effect of increasing the number of polluters, an industry consisting of a single large firm is compared with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm. In contrast to previous findings, both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators. |
SCIMA