haku: @journal_id 1464 / yhteensä: 220
viite: 81 / 220
| Tekijä: | Capra, C. M. |
| Otsikko: | Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition |
| Lehti: | International Economic Review
2002 : AUG, VOL. 43:3, p. 613-636 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS RESEARCH PRICES COMPETITION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors of the article consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. The high-price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high-price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final-period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices. |
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