haku: @indexterm Industrial organization / yhteensä: 223
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Tekijä:Laat, E.
Otsikko:Patents or prizes: monopolistic R&D and asymmetric information
Lehti:International Journal of Industrial Organization
1997 : MAY, VOL. 15:3, p. 369-390
Asiasana:INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL
R&D
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:In this paper a model of R&D regulation is analysed to compare the effect of two types of asymmetric information on the welfare properties of patents and prizes as R&D incentive instruments when there is a technological leader. Using the case of full information as a benchmark, it is found that the trade-off between patents and prizes does not change if the innovator's R&D cost are private information, whereas the relative efficiency of patents decreases if the government is less informed about the market for the innovation.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 171296
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