haku: @indexterm welfare economics / yhteensä: 236
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Tekijä:Rubio, S. J.
Casino, B.
Otsikko:Strategic behavior and efficiency in the common property extraction of groundwater
Lehti:Environmental and Resource Economics
2003 : SEP, VOL. 26:1, p. 73-87
Asiasana:Environmental economics
Water resources
Strategic management
Welfare economics
Stochastic processes
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:Externalities that erise from private exploitation of groundwater are analyzed by comparing socially optimal and private extraction. Open-loop Nash equilibrium and stationary Markov feedback equilibrium in nonlinear startegies have been computed to characterize private extraction. The results show that strategic behaviour increases the overexploitation of the aquifer. However, if the groundwater storage capacity is large, the difference between the socially optimal and private extraction is negligible.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 253044
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