haku: @indexterm welfare economics / yhteensä: 236
viite: 129 / 236
| Tekijä: | Suzumura, K. Kiyono, K. |
| Otsikko: | Entry barriers and economic welfare. |
| Lehti: | Review of Economic Studies
1987 : JAN, VOL. 54:177, p. 157-167 |
| Asiasana: | WELFARE ECONOMICS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi-Cournot market is examined. The existence of a strong government that can enforce the marginal-cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms is presupposed. It is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free-entry quasi-Cournot equilibrium vis-a-vis the "first best" welfare maximizing number of firms. The thrust of this result essentially survives even if an utopian "first best" government is replaced by a "second-best" government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms. |
SCIMA