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| Tekijä: | Novaes, W. |
| Otsikko: | Capital structure choice when managers are in control: entrenchment versus efficiency |
| Lehti: | Journal of Business
2003 : JAN, VOL. 76:1, p. 49-81 |
| Asiasana: | Capital structure of companies Gearing Mergers Shareholders |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In the free-cash-flow theory, shareholders use debt to discipline managers and maximize firm value. In contrast, managerial models assume that, without a takeover threat, managers will not lever up to constrain themselves. This article demonstrates that a take-over threat is unlikely to reconcile these two theories. |
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