haku: @author Sen, A. / yhteensä: 24
viite: 11 / 24
| Tekijä: | Sen, A. |
| Otsikko: | Entry and managerial incentives. |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1993 : MAR, VOL. 11:1, p. 123-137 |
| Asiasana: | ENTRY CONDITIONS INCENTIVES MODELS MANAGERS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article presents a two-period full-information model of entry where owners of incumbent and entrant firms endogenously select the incentive schemes for their managers. It is shown that when output decisions are delegated to managers, the incumbent's owner choses to base incentive schemes only on profit. But if output decisions are reached via Nash bargaining, between managers, the incumbent's owner will base the reward on profit alone. If there is a sufficiently fixed cost of entry, then the incumbent can deter entry by providing management with appropriate incentive schemes. |
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