haku: @indexterm public companies / yhteensä: 257
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Tekijä:Gersbach, H.
Keil, M.
Otsikko:Productivity improvements in public organisations
Lehti:Economic Journal
2005 : JUL, VOL. 115:505, p. 671-688
Asiasana:productivity
public companies
Vapaa asiasana:collusion
rotation
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This article discusses productivity improvement in a public organization and the scope it has for motivating agents, when standard stick and carrot incentives cannot be used. Th authors show that as long as agents do not collude, the principal can use rotation and tournament schemes to eliminate slck in the organization. Furthermore, to break collusion between agents, there is no incentive scheme that can overcome collusion.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 262827
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