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Tekijä:Brandts, J.
MacLeod, W.
Otsikko:Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play
Lehti:Games and Economic Behavior
1995 : OCT, VOL. 11:1, p. 36-63
Asiasana:GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
ECONOMICS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects' behavior. For two-stage games the authors find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 140440
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