haku: @indexterm Games / yhteensä: 259
viite: 134 / 259
Tekijä:Kocherlakota, N.
Otsikko:Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency
Lehti:Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : JUL, VOL. 15:1, p. 33-54
Asiasana:GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
TIME
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper examines a game in which an infinitely lived decision maker with inconsistent preferences makes choices over time. There are typically many subgame perfect equilibria to this game; the author describes a refinement of subgame perfection the she terms reconsideration- proofness. There is always a reconsideration-proof equilibrium and all reconsideration-proof equilibrium paths provide the same utility to the decision maker. The author shows that reconsideration-proofness is relevant for macroeconomic policy games.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 153023
lisää koriin
SCIMA