haku: @indexterm Games / yhteensä: 259
viite: 132 / 259
| Tekijä: | Watson, J. |
| Otsikko: | Reputation in repeated games with no discounting |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : JUL, VOL. 15:1, p. 82-109 |
| Asiasana: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR ECONOMICS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The author studies two-player, infinitely repeated games with no discounting. The author actually examines how perturbations afford players opportunities to establish reputations and determines how potential reputations lead to outcome selection in both equilibrium and non-equilibrium settings. The main result is the following. Assume that players have beliefs of countable support, players only adopt "forgiving strategies", and players best-respond beliefs (a forgiving strategy does not punish an opponent forever). |
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