haku: @indexterm Games / yhteensä: 259
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| Tekijä: | Faynzilberg, P. Kumar, P. |
| Otsikko: | Optimal contracting of separable production technologies |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1997 : OCT/NOV, VOL. 21:1/2, p. 15-39 |
| Asiasana: | GAMES TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The author analyzes the class of agency problems with a risk-neutral principle and a risk-averse agent, in which hidden actions and hidden information (on the agent's efficiency) are jointly present. Technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule. The author shows that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent's inputs. |
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