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| Tekijä: | Chami, R. Fullenkamp, C. |
| Otsikko: | The Optimal Subsidy to Private Transfers Under Moral Hazard |
| Lehti: | IMF Staff Papers
2002 : VOL. 49:2, p. 242-251 |
| Asiasana: | SUBSIDIES MORAL HAZARD TRANSFER PAYMENTS COSTS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Recently, governments have become more interested in using private, nonmarket income transfers to supplement or substitute for government income transfers. The motivations for this include fiscal necessity, the belief that the private sector can allocate resources more efficiently than the government sector, and the negative effects of government transfer programs on their recipients' behavior. Private income transfers are increasingly viewed as an alternative to government income transfers such as social insurance and foreign aid. This paper models the incentive effects of government- subsidized private transfers and finds that although there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers, there is also a significant welfare cost. |
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