haku: @author Shane, S. / yhteensä: 27
viite: 13 / 27
| Tekijä: | Shane, S. |
| Otsikko: | Organizational incentives and organizational mortality |
| Lehti: | Organization Science
2001 : MAR-APR, VOL. 12:2, p. 136-160 |
| Asiasana: | CONTRACTS EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS FRANCHISING |
| Vapaa asiasana: | FIRM SURVIVAL |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper examines the effect of incentive contracting on the survival of U.S. business format franchise systems over the period 1984-1996. The paper finds empirical support for several hypotheses derived from efficient contracting theory. In general, large firms that adopt policies which screen agents, signal quality, and control agents' free-riding are more likely to survive than large firms which do not adopt these policies. |
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