haku: @author Chatterjee, S. / yhteensä: 28
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| Tekijä: | Chatterjee, S. Dhillon, U. Ramirez, G. |
| Otsikko: | Coercive tender and exchange offers in distressed high-yield debt restructurings: an empirical analysis |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial Economics
1995 : MAR, VOL. 38:3, p. 333-360 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS FINANCE EXCHANGE RATES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper examines a recent sample of public workouts for distressed high-yield debt. The nature of holdouts and the effectiveness of coercive tactics in alleviating the holdout problem is analyzed. Tender offers are in relatively less financial distress, exhibit more severe holdouts, and are more coercive than exchange offers. Tender offers also have higher completion rates and fewer Chapter 11 filings. |
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