haku: @indexterm Agency theory / yhteensä: 286
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Tekijä:Sabherwal, S.
Smith, S.D.
Otsikko:Concentrated shareholders as substitutes for outside analysts
Lehti:Corporate governance
2008 : NOV, VOL. 16:6, p. 562-577
Asiasana:corporate governance
financial analysis
agency theory
companies
USA
Vapaa asiasana:concentrated shareholdings
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper examines the relationship of concentration (hereafter as: cntrn.) of shareholdings with the number of financial analysts following a firm to see if shareholders' cntrn. substitute for the monitoring activities of analysts.
Using a clean ownership dataset with a sample of over 3,100 firm-year observations for U.S. firms and regression techniques addressing any potential endogeneity, it is found that analyst following is negatively related to the cntrn. of outsider and insider shareholdings. Similar relations are found for changes in analyst following and changes in ownership cntrn.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 276456
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