haku: @indexterm health insurance / yhteensä: 29
viite: 23 / 29
| Tekijä: | Blomqvist, A. Johansson, P. |
| Otsikko: | Economic efficiency and mixed public/private insurance |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
1997 : DEC, VOL. 66:3, p. 505-516 |
| Asiasana: | HEALTH INSURANCE MORAL HAZARD GOVERNMENT |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In this paper the authors discuss the efficiency properties of insurance markets where supplementary private insurance is allowed to exist together with a compulsory government insurance plan. The authors' main conclusion, which is contrary to both those of Besley (1989) and Selden (1993), is that in a simple model focusing on the moral hazard problem alone, a mixed system will generally be strictly less efficient than a purely private (competitive) system. The authors also show that Selden's (1993) main proposition is valid in only very special circumstances. |
SCIMA