haku: @author Gatsios, K. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 2 / 3
| Tekijä: | Gatsios, K. Karp, L. |
| Otsikko: | How anti-merger laws can reduce investment, help producers, and hurt consumers |
| Lehti: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1992 : SEP, VOL. 40:3, p.339-348 |
| Asiasana: | MERGERS COMPANY LAW INVESTMENT CONSUMERS PROFIT PRICES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Legal restrictions against mergers are intended to protect consumers against monopolistic pricing; to the extent that the restrictions are successful, they are expected to benefit consumers and reduce industry profits. However, anti-merger laws can have the opposite effect: they can increase profits and reduce consumer welfare. These apparently paradoxical results are explained. If capital lowers marginal cost and a firm with more capital gets a bigger share of the surplus in merger bargaining, then the equilibrium price with a merger may be lower than without a merger. If entry is restricted the level of industry profits minus investment costs may be higher if mergers are prohibited. Thus a permissive law may benefit consumers. |
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