haku: @author Michaelis, P. / yhteensä: 3
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Tekijä:Michaelis, P.
Otsikko:Regulate us please! On strategic lobbying in Cournot-Nash oligopoly
Lehti:Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1994 : DEC, VOL. 150:4, p. 693-709
Asiasana:OLIGOPOLY
STRATEGY
SCENARIOS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:Empirical studies on industry lobbying sometimes reveal that certain firms within an industry behave atypically in that they promote cost driving regulations like, e.g., environmental standards. For analyzing this phenomenon of "strategic lobbying", the present paper combines a heterogeneous Cournot-Nash oligopoly with a model of endogenous policy making where two parties compete for campaign contributions spent by the regulated industry.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 127045
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