haku: @author Branco, F. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 2 / 3
| Tekijä: | Branco, F. |
| Otsikko: | Multiple unit auctions of an invisible good |
| Lehti: | Economic Theory
1996 : JUN, VOL. 8:1, p. 77-102 |
| Asiasana: | THEORIES ECONOMICS AUCTIONS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper studies the properties of several multiple unit auctions in the context of a general model that allows for private values and common values as special cases. The benchmark for the analysis is provided by the characterization of optimal selling procedures for a seller that has several units of a homogeneous indivisible good to be sold extending the analysis of a single unit model. It is shown that the seller should impose endogenous individual minimum announcements, that are contingent on the bidders' reports and decreasing as the number of units allocated to the buyer increase. |
SCIMA