haku: @author Balachandran, K. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 2 / 3
| Tekijä: | Li, S. Balachandran, K. |
| Otsikko: | Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information |
| Lehti: | European Journal of Operational Research
1997 : APR 1, VOL. 98:1, p. 138-153 |
| Asiasana: | OPERATIONAL RESEARCH MANAGEMENT MANAGERS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper models a decentralised firm under information asymmetry and effort disutility on the part of managers. The authors assume that managers choose efforts before observing some private information. However, after the effort choice managers receive private information on their cost parameters which they report to the headquarters. There exist many situations in which managers need to take efforts before obtaining private information; for example, the regular maintenance effort on the machine, the effort on R&D for reducing costs and the effort taken to build relationships with the supplier. |
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