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| Tekijä: | Battigalli, P. |
| Otsikko: | On rationalizability in extensive games |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1997 : MAY, VOL. 74:1, p. 40-61 |
| Asiasana: | GAMES RATIONALISATION STRATEGY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Pearce's notion of extensive form rationalizability (EFR) is analyzed in this study. The study shows that EFR can be characterized in terms of restrictions on players' updating systems, although it was defined as a reduction procedure at first place. The restrictions correspond to a common hierarchy of nested hypotheses. EFR is realization-equivalent to iterated weak dominance and backward induction in generic games of perfect information. In the subset of games with iterated perfect information, equivalence with iterated weak dominance is complete. |
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