haku: @author Rothschild, R. / yhteensä: 3
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| Tekijä: | Rothschild, R. |
| Otsikko: | Two noncooperative equilibria for a collusive duopoly with a finite lifespan |
| Lehti: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1997 : JUN, VOL. 153:2, p. 356-366 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS DUOPOLY THEORIES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper addresses the problem of maintaining collusion in a differentiated duopoly with a finite lifespan. Using a trigger strategy devised by Friedman (1985), the author identifies two necessary noncooperative equilibria, and shows that when both the prospective deviant and punisher are free to choose between price and output as their strategic variables the dominant noncooperative equilibrium is Cournot while the dominated noncooperative equilibrium is asymmetric in the two variables. |
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